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Abstract. This paper shows how the outputs of the accounting measurement process can be translated into terms 
that can be used in economic decisions. We introduce the notion of Term Structure of Capital Values (TSCV), 
uniquely associated to a Term Structure of Interest Rates (TSIR). We show that the state of temporary disequilibrium 
created by an asset (project, firm, etc.) introduced in a market can be described in terms of a pair of internal TSCV 
and TSIR. Any internal TSCV determines a specific depreciation schedule for the asset and the corresponding TSIR 
determines an economic rate of return obtained as a capital-weighted average of the Return On Assets collected in 
the TSIR. The difference between this economic rate of return and the overall equilibrium rate (itself an average of 
the equilibrium forward rates) correctly captures value creation. The determination of a specific (internal) TSCV 
depends on the way the market sweeps away arbitrage opportunities and restores the equilibrium. As each possible 
accounting system can be viewed as being associated with a corresponding disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process 
and therefore with a corresponding economic rate of return, the paper shows that the determination of an economic 
rate of return is both a matter of accounting (in terms of a specific internal TSCV) and a matter of finance (in terms 
of a specific disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process). This evidently calls for a theory of capital valuation capable of 
associating the proper TSCV with each asset so that the intrinsic underdetermination of the economic rate of return 
can be solved. 
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Introduction 
 
The quest for profit plays a pivotal role in the workings of capitalist economies.  A well-functioning 
market economy will direct resources into more profitable activities and withdraw them from less 
profitable ones. The determination of economic profitability is therefore a matter of central importance; 
this is reflected in the fact that the process governing the production of earnings numbers is subject to 
considerable oversight by auditors and regulators.  The rules governing accounting and financial reporting 
now run to thousands of pages, and considerable time, energy and resources are devoted to assessing the 
results.  The critical issue addressed in this paper is how the outputs of the accounting measurement 
process can be translated into terms that can be used in economic decisions. 
There is a general agreement, in the financial and accounting literatures, as to the strengths of Net 
Present Value (NPV) as a measure of economic profitability, for it quantifies the monetary increase of the 
investors’ wealth. However, in real-life applications, there is a demand to express economic profitability 
as a relative measure (e.g. a rate) rather than an absolute one. The reason seems to lie in the greater 
intuitive appeal of a relative metric such as a percentage return as opposed to an absolute amount of 
money (see Evans and Forbes, 1993). Value creation depends on the cost of capital, a relative measure 
itself; so, comparing two relative measures of worth is more natural than checking the sign of an absolute 
measure which depends on a relative one. To such an extent is a relative metric preferred by practitioners 
that scholars are sometimes criticized for endorsing the use of an absolute measure: “For abstruse reasons 
… college professors prefer NPV analysis over IRR analysis. But all surveys indicate that lenders find it 
more appealing to analyze potential investments in terms of percentage rates of return rather than by 
comparing dollars of NPV” (Yung and Sherman, 1995, p. 18).  
Unfortunately, there is no consensus on what “profitability” means in relative terms. A variety of 
relative metrics are used by firms in investment decision-making (Gitman and Forrester, 1977; Stanley 
and Block, 1984; Remer, Stokdyk and Van Driel, 1993; Burns and Walker, 1997; Graham and Harvey, 
2001; Ryan and Ryan, 2002; Brounen, de Jong and Koedijk, 2004). Most corporate finance and 
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engineering economy textbooks (and some actuarial mathematics ones) therefore devote several pages to 
a variety of metrics the connections between which have received relatively little attention (see Remer 
and Nieto, 1995a,b; Hartman, 2007; Broverman, 2008; Kellison, 2009; Ross, Westerfiel and Jordan, 
2011; Brealey, Myers and Allen, 2011; Blank and Tarquin, 2014, Park, 2013). The most commonly 
mentioned of these metrics are the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and the Average Accounting Return 
(AAR). 
Traditionally, the IRR has been viewed as the “gold standard” measure among these alternatives 
to NPV, as reflected in the fact that it is often called the “economic rate of return” against which the AAR 
(and related variants) are to be judged (Harcourt, 1965; Solomon, 1966; Livingstone and Salamon, 1970; 
Kay, 1976; Peasnell, 1982a,b; Fisher and McGowan, 1983; Luckett, 1984; Salamon, 1985; Whittington, 
1988; Peasnell, 1996; Stark, 2004. See also Feenstra and Wang’s, 2000, review and references therein). 
However, Magni (2010, 2013, 2015) show that the IRR is itself just a special case of a more general class 
of metrics, highlighting the critical role of a project’s capital values in the determination of any rate of 
return measure, and thereby undermining the case for according the IRR special status as an economic 
concept.
3
 The present paper builds on these foundations. Starting from the well-known notion of the 
“term structure of interest rates” (TSIR) of an equilibrium market, we introduce the notion of the “Term 
Structure of Capital Values” (TSCV). We show that any asset introduced in the market creates a state of 
temporary disequilibrium. The process according to which equilibrium is restored by the market is not 
unique and each feasible disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process generates a corresponding internal TSIR, 
which represents a vector of internal holding period rates. Each such TSIR is uniquely related to an 
internal TSCV and the project rate of return is shown to be an average of the TSIR’s holding period rates 
weighted by the (present values of the) components of the TSCV.   
                                                        
3 As far as we can ascertain, Bailey (1959) was first to recognize that that the IRR is a single, long-term rate having 
no inherent economic superiority to the whole sequence of time-variant holding-period rates associated with a multi-
period project: “Recognition of the correct general solution of the investment problem has been hindered by the 
habit of thinking in terms of a single, long-term rate of interest" (p. 477); “This is an example of the “paradox" that 
have attracted so much attention in connection with investment decision criteria. It should be evident, however, that 
this paradox is merely an accident of the simplifying device of dealing with a single long-term rate of interest, and 
that it has no special importance in the more general framework used here" (pp. 478-479).  
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We study the implications of this framework for accounting. The choice of the appropriate TSCV 
for describing a project represents a choice as to how the capital values (i.e., the asset) is to be represented 
over the life of the project. This is strictly related to the way the market resolves the disequilibrium 
generated by the announcement of a project’s acceptance by a firm’s management team.  Different 
choices of TSCV lead to different internal TSIRs, that is, to different sequences of Return on Assets 
(ROA), which then correspond to different ways in which the market reacts to restore the equilibrium. As 
a result,  different Average ROAs capable of signalling wealth creation are available to the analyst. The 
choice as to which Average ROA is most appropriate is a domain-specific issue and a matter of value 
judgment. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 introduces the notion of TSCV and 
shows that it is biunivocally associated with a given TSIR. Section 2 focuses on the state of temporary 
disequilibrium generated in the market by the announcement of a project’s acceptance and describes how 
an efficient market rapidly restores the equilibrium. Section 3 introduces the notions of internal (i.e., 
disequilibrium) TSCV and TSIR: Each internal TSCV (and corresponding TSIR) is an expression of a 
conceptually well-determined pricing mechanism that tends to restore, more or less rapidly, the 
equilibrium in the market. This section also shows the relations between said pricing mechanism and the 
capital-weighted average of the internal interest rates, which validly captures the asset’s economic 
profitability in an NPV-consistent way. The relations with the shareholders’ rate of return are illustrated 
and the well-known profitability index is shown to be an instantaneous rate of return linked to the 
windfall gain earned by shareholders in an efficient market. Section 4 applies the results of the previous 
sections  to accounting rates of return and shows that the average ROA represents an economically 
significant rate of return related to a gradual disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process associated with the 
internal TSCV. Section 5 explains that the selection of the disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process (and, 
therefore, the choice of the TSCV) cannot be made on a mathematical basis: It is domain-specific and a 
matter of accounting. The domain-specificity of the rate of return calls for a theory of capital valuation, 
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on the understanding that a project is not a mere sequence of cash flows but a sequence of capital values 
as well, whose determination affects the notion of rate of return. Some concluding remarks end the paper. 
 
1. The term structure of interest rates and the term structure of capital values 
To fix ideas, we adopt the usual convention of the flows in period t (i.e., the period between time 𝑡 − 1 
and time 𝑡) occurring at the end of the period and assume the existence of a security market which is 
efficient and in equilibrium. This means that arbitrage opportunities are not available and, when 
disequilibrium arises, the market quickly re-establishes a new equilibrium. The term structure of interest 
rates (TSIR), graphically represented by the yield curve, is described by a sequence 𝒔 = (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑛) ∈
ℝ+
𝑛  of spot rates, which is uniquely related to the sequence of spot prices 𝒗 = (𝑣1,0, … , 𝑣𝑛,0) ∈ ℝ+
𝑛 , where 
𝑣𝑡,0 = (1 + 𝑠𝑡)
−𝑡 is the unit price of a zero-coupon bond (zcb). The TSIR can be alternatively represented 
by a sequence of implicit forward rates 𝒓 = (𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑛) ∈ ℝ+
𝑛 , recursively defined as (1 + 𝑠𝑡)
𝑡 = (1 +
𝑠𝑡−1)
𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡). The interest rate 𝑟𝑡 then represents the one-period return of a traded asset per unit of 
capital invested at the beginning of the 𝑡-th period. The unit price of a zcb of length 𝑡 can be written as 
𝑣𝑡,0 = (1 + 𝑟1)
−1 ∙ (1 + 𝑟2)
−1 ∙ … ∙ (1 + 𝑟𝑡)
−1.We allow for the possibility that the yield curve need not 
be flat, that is, that spot and forward rates are time-variant.  
Let 𝑭 = (𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝑛) ∈ ℝ
𝑛 be any sequence of cash flows. The equilibrium assumption imposes 
that the price of any such cash-flow stream must be given by the present value of the prospective cash 
flows, discounted at the spot (or forward) rates. Denoting as 𝑉0 the price of the asset, 
𝑉0 = ∑
𝐹ℎ
(1 + 𝑟1) ∙ (1 + 𝑟2) ∙ … ∙ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑛
ℎ=1
.                                              (1𝑎) 
Equation (1a) can be written as 
−𝑉0 + ∑
𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑟1) ∙ (1 + 𝑟2) ∙ … ∙ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑛
ℎ=1
= 0                                       (1𝑏) 
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which means that such an asset has a net present value (NPV) equal to zero. In general, the economic (i.e., 
market) value implied by the TSIR is such that 𝑉𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡) − 𝐹𝑡 , which describes the evolution of 
the capital invested. The amount  𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑡−1 is the investor’s return. Also, by backward induction,  
𝑉𝑡 =
𝑉𝑡+1 + 𝐹𝑡+1
1 + 𝑟𝑡+1
= ∑
𝐹ℎ
(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1) ∙ (1 + 𝑟𝑡+2) ∙ … ∙ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑛
ℎ=𝑡+1
                                 (2) 
for   𝑡 = 0,1, … , 𝑛 − 1. Equation (1) is, of course, a special case of (2), when 𝑡 = 0.  
 Given any asset 𝑭, the sequence 𝑽 = (𝑉0, 𝑉1, … , 𝑉𝑛−1) ∈ ℝ
𝑛 of economic values is uniquely 
related to 𝒓 via (2). In other words an implicit “Term Structure of Capital Values” (TSCV) exists, for any 
given 𝑭, which is biunivocally associated with the TSIR. The triplet (𝑭, 𝒓, 𝑽) completely identifies an 
asset in the market in which the choice of any two of the elements is sufficient to completely describe the 
asset. The elements of 𝒓 are the period return rates, while the elements of 𝑽 represent the invested capital 
amounts period by period. 
 
2. From disequilibrium to equilibrium: Net Present Value and wealth creation 
Suppose a firm has the opportunity of undertaking a project, whose cash flows are 𝐹𝑡 , 𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑛. 
Henceforth, we will assume for analytical purposes that flows are certain or, equivalently, that they are 
uncertain and that risk is dealt with by representing the flows as certainty equivalents.
4
 Let 𝐶0 be the 
project cost. The acceptance of the project by the firm’s managers creates a temporary state of 
disequilibrium (Rubinstein, 1973). If the market is efficient, the disequilibrium is arbitraged away rapidly 
by the market forces in the following way. Before acceptance of the project, the equilibrium value 𝒱0 of 
the firm is   
𝒱0 = ∑
ℱ𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑡
ℎ=1
𝑛
𝑡=1
                                                           (3𝑎) 
𝒱0 = 𝑁 ∙ 𝑃                                                                                   (3𝑏) 
                                                        
4 In practice, risk is usually dealt with by expressing cash flows as expected values and making risk adjustments via 
the discount rates(s). The results reported in this paper are unchanged if risk is dealt with in this manner. 
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where ℱ𝑡 = firm’s free cash flows at time 𝑡, 𝑁 = number of shares outstanding at time 0, and 𝑃 = current 
share price. With no loss of generality, we assume the project is equity-financed. When the acceptance of 
the project is announced, the market reacts and the new equilibrium firm’s value 𝒱0
′ is set as 
 𝒱0
′ = ∑
ℱ𝑡 + 𝐹𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑡
ℎ=1
𝑛
𝑡=1
                                                            (4𝑎) 
𝒱0
′ = (𝑁 + 𝑁′) ∙ 𝑃′                                                                     (4𝑏) 
where 𝑃′ is the new equilibrium price and 𝑁′ = 𝐶0/𝑃′ is the number of new shares issued at the price 𝑃
′ 
to finance the project.
5
 Subtracting (3b) from (4b), 
𝒱0
′ − 𝒱0 = 𝑁 ∙ (𝑃
′ − 𝑃) + 𝑁′𝑃′.                                               (5𝑎) 
Also, subtracting (3a) from (4a),  
𝒱0
′ − 𝒱0 = ∑
𝐹𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑡
ℎ=1
𝑛
𝑡=1
= 𝑉0                                             (5𝑏) 
Using (5a), (5b), and the financing requirement that 𝑁′𝑃′ = 𝐶0 , 
𝑉0 − 𝐶0 = 𝑁(𝑃
′ − 𝑃).                                                              (6) 
The left-hand side of (6) is the project’s NPV, the right-hand side is shareholders’ wealth 
increase/decrease.
6
 Wealth is created for shareholders if and only if 𝑃′ > 𝑃, which occurs if and only if 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0. The NPV is a ‘windfall gain’ that benefits the firm’s existing shareholders.7 
In general, whenever any asset with cash-flow stream 𝑭 is introduced in the market at a price of 
𝐶0 that is inconsistent with the TSIR (i.e., 𝐶0 ≠ 𝑉0), the one-price law is infringed and an arbitrage 
opportunity arises. An efficient market reacts (i.e., arbitrageurs intervene) and the price 𝐶0 of the new 
asset increases until it reaches 𝑉0,
8
 so that equilibrium is re-established.
9
  
 
 
 
3. The equilibrium condition and the internal market 
                                                        
5 This analysis assumes that the market is not so efficient as to be able anticipate the project’s acceptance and yet it 
is sufficiently efficient that when it learns of the project it forms expectations that accord with those of the 
managers. If either (or both) of these assumptions are false, the equilibriating process will not be instantaneous. We 
address the issue of the equilibriating process in section 3 below. 
6 𝑁(𝑃′ − 𝑃) is the wealth increase/decrease for the “old” shareholders, not the “new” shareholders, who purchase 
the new 𝑁′ shares at the new equilibrium price 𝑃′(i.e., the latter make a zero-NPV investment). 
7 NPV is “a `windfall gain', which accrues to the owners of the firm as a result of their being able to invest in a 
project that is more profitable than the standard market rate” (Robichek and Myers, 1965, p. 11). 
8 “Given the market strives for equilibrium, the market value of the stock will increase by more than the investment 
outlay" (Bierman and Hass, 1973, p. 122). 
9 As usual in this kind of analysis, we assume that the number of assets in the security market is so large that the 
introduction of the new asset does not affect the TSIR. 
 8 
 
The disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process that a project undertaking generates can be equivalently 
illustrated in terms of divergence between two alternative markets. To this end, consider a disequilibrium 
TSIR, 𝒊 = (𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛) such that  
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐹ℎ
(1 + 𝑖1) ∙ (1 + 𝑖2) ∙ … ∙ (1 + 𝑖ℎ)
𝑛
ℎ=1
.                                                  (7) 
Equation (7) can be interpreted as the arbitrage-free condition of a hypothetical market where the 
equilibrium TSIR is 𝒊. We call such a hypothetical market the ‘internal market’ and 𝒊 is the ‘internal 
TSIR’ ’); the price 𝐶0 is then the equilibrium price of the project in the internal market. The difference 
between the two equilibrium prices in (2) and (7) measures the magnitude of the wealth created by the 
project undertaken by the firm. In this way, we formalize the disequilibrium as a difference between two 
alternative equilibrium prices, holding in alternative markets. Such a deviation just expresses the project’s 
economic profitability: 𝑉0 − 𝐶0.  
There are many ways in which (7) can deviate from (2) in terms of interest rates; equivalently 
stated, there are many ways in which disequilibrium is resolved and equilibrium is restored. Equation (7) 
is solved by infinitely many internal TSIRs, 𝒊 = (𝑖1, 𝑖2, … , 𝑖𝑛). Let 𝛾𝑡  be such that (1 + 𝑖𝑡) = (1 +
𝑟𝑡)(1 + 𝛾𝑡) so that the 𝛾𝑡’s represent the relative deviations of the internal TSIR 𝒊 from the yield curve 𝒓. 
Therefore, (7) can be written as 
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐹ℎ
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑗)(1 + 𝛾𝑗)
ℎ
𝑗=1
𝑛
ℎ=1
                                                           (8) 
There are an infinite number of solutions 𝜸 = (𝛾1, 𝛾2 , … , 𝛾𝑛) to (8). Different solutions describe (different 
TSIRs 𝒊 and therefore) different equilibrium conditions in the internal market resulting in the same price, 
𝐶0. To any possible deviating vector 𝜸 (and to any possible 𝒊) there corresponds a well-defined internal 
TSCV, 𝑪 = (𝐶0 , 𝐶1 , … , 𝐶𝑛−1), such that 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1(1 + 𝑖𝑡) − 𝐹𝑡  or, alternatively,  
  𝐶𝑡 =
𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝐹𝑡+1
1 + 𝑖𝑡+1
= ∑
𝐹ℎ
∏ (1 + 𝑟𝑗)(1 + 𝛾𝑗)
ℎ
𝑗=𝑡+1
𝑛
ℎ=𝑡+1
                𝑡 = 0,1, … , 𝑛 − 1       (9) 
(note that (8) is a particular case of (9) for 𝑡 = 0). One possible solution of (8) is 𝜸 = (𝛾1 , 0,0, … ,0), 
which means that 𝒊 = (𝑗, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝑛) such that (1 + 𝑗) = (1 + 𝑟1)(1 + 𝛾1). Therefore, the internal TSIR is 
equal to 𝒓 except in the first period. Thus, (8) becomes 
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑟1)(1 + 𝛾1) ∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑡
ℎ=2
𝑛
𝑡=1
                                                (10) 
It is worth noting that (10) is a formal description of the pricing mechanism illustrated in the previous 
section, when the market wipes out disequilibrium rapidly, within one period. Indeed, solving (10) for 𝛾1, 
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one finds 𝐶0(1 + 𝛾1) = 𝑉0, whence 𝛾1 = 𝑃𝐼 where 𝑃𝐼 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉/𝐶0 is the well-known profitability index. 
𝑃𝐼 represents an interest rate that marks up the first-period cost of capital 𝑟1 to the first-period rate of 
return 𝑗. From the definition of 𝛾1 one finds 
𝑃𝐼 =
𝑗 − 𝑟1
1 + 𝑟1
.                                                                          (11) 
Multiplying (11) by 𝐶0,  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 =
𝐶0 ∙ (𝑗 − 𝑟1)
1 + 𝑟1
                                                                   (12) 
The numerator on the right-hand side of Equation (12) is the excess return generated in the first-period . 
Thus, NPV is equal to the period 1 excess return discounted at the required rate for that period. In the 
subsequent periods the excess return is zero: 𝛾𝑡 = 0 implies  𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 for 𝑡 > 1 which implies 𝐶𝑡−1 (𝑖𝑡 −
𝑟𝑡) = 0 in those periods. Therefore, the first-period rate 𝑗 correctly captures wealth creation when 
compared to 𝑟1: from (12), 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0      𝑖𝑓𝑓    𝑗 > 𝑟1                                                            (13) 
The first-period rate 𝑗 properly captures, in relative terms, such a pricing mechanism. The intuition behind 
it is very simple: Investors invest 𝐶0 at time 0 and receive an asset which is worth 𝑉1 at the end of the first 
period, alongside the cash flow 𝐹1. Therefore, the rate of return in the first period is 
𝑉1+𝐹1
𝑐
− 1. The latter 
is equal to 𝑗, since  
𝑉1 + 𝐹1
𝐶0
− 1 =
𝑉0(1 + 𝑟1) − 𝐶0(1 + 𝑟1) + 𝑟1𝐶0
𝐶0
= 𝑟1 + 𝑃𝐼(1 + 𝑟1) = 𝑗.                 (14) 
To sum up, in the case of a mispriced asset, the market is assumed to react at time 0 so as to boost the 
misaligned price up by 𝑃𝐼 in order to reestablish the equilibrium price 𝑉0 (i.e., 𝑃𝐼 =
𝑉0−𝐶0
𝐶0
). At the 
beginning of period  𝑡 > 1, the invested capital is the economic value 𝑉𝑡−1 and the return is 𝑟𝑡𝑉𝑡−1 , 𝑡 =
2, … , 𝑛, so no more value is created. This process is typical of an efficient market: “after equilibrium is 
restored, nothing else occurs, for there is no tendency for subsequent increases and decreases” (Ross, 
Westerfield and Jordan, p. 327). By (9), this also implies that the TSCV corresponding to 𝒊 = (𝑗, 𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑛) 
is 𝑪 = (𝐶0, 𝑉1, , … , 𝑉𝑛).  The elements of 𝒊 = (𝑗, 𝑟1, … , 𝑟𝑛) describe the project’s relative performance 
period by period, while the elements of 𝑪 represent, period by period, the invested capital to which the 
period rates are applied. 
We are now able to express the project’s economic profitability in relative terms. Taking into 
account the time-value of money, the project’s overall return 𝑥 is the sum of the period returns; the latter 
can be expressed as sum of products of period rate and invested capital:  
𝑥 = 𝑗𝐶0 ∙ 𝑣1,0 + 𝑟2𝑉1 ∙ 𝑣2,0 + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑛𝑉𝑛−1 ∙ 𝑣𝑛,0,                                     (15) 
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where, recall, 𝑣𝑡,0 = 𝑣 = ∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
−1𝑡
ℎ=1  is the spot price of cash in period t. The return can be written 
as  𝑥 = 𝑗̅ ∙ 𝐶, where 𝐶: = 𝐶0 + 𝑉1 ∙ 𝑣1,0 + ⋯ + 𝑉𝑛−1 ∙ 𝑣𝑛−1,0 so that 
𝑗 ̅ =
𝑥
𝐶
.                                                                                 (16) 
Equation (16) can also be framed as a linear combination of the project’s holding period rates, weighted 
by the project’s values collected in the internal TSCV: 𝜃1𝑗 + 𝜃2𝑟2 + ⋯ + 𝜃𝑛𝑟𝑛, with 𝜃1 =
𝐶0𝑣1,0
𝐶
, 𝜃𝑡 =
𝑉𝑡−1𝑣𝑡,0
𝐶
 , 𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑛.  Also, it is easily seen that 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐶 ⋅ (𝑗̅ − ?̅?)                                                                     (17) 
where 
?̅? = 𝑟1𝜃1 + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑛𝜃𝑛. 
The project is then interpretable as an investment of  𝐶 dollars at the rate of return 𝑗,̅ while ?̅? represents 
the opportunity cost of capital, that is, the overall equilibrium rate of return that investors would get if 
capital  𝐶 were invested in a portfolio traded in a market where the TSIR is equal to 𝒓. Equation (17) 
implies 
𝑗 ̅ = ?̅? +
𝑁𝑃𝑉
𝐶
.                                                                      (18) 
From (17) or (18),  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0      𝑖𝑓𝑓     𝑗 ̅ > ?̅?.                                                          (19) 
The case where 𝐶 < 0 represents a situation where the asset is a net borrowing and 𝑗 ̅represents a 
borrowing rate, so that 𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0 if and only if 𝑗 ̅ < ?̅? . We will call 𝑗 ̅the ‘shareholder rate of return’ 
(SRR). Both 𝑗 ̅and ?̅? depend on 𝑪 = (𝐶, 𝑉1, … , 𝑉𝑛),  which is the expression of the pricing mechanism of 
an efficient market that sweeps away disequilibrium via a windfall gain. The excess returns (𝑗 − 𝑟1) and 
(𝑗̅ − ?̅?) are then relative measures that quantify the wealth created by the project per unit of invested 
capital 𝐶0 and per unit of overall invested capital 𝐶, respectively.  
The previous case where 𝜸 = (𝑃𝐼, 0,0, … ,0 ) presupposes that the interim values of the project are 
equal to the economic values determined by an efficient market: 𝐶𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡  for 𝑡 ≥ 1. More generally, if  
𝛾𝑡 ≠ 0 for 𝑡 > 1 the internal TSCV is such that  𝐶𝑡 ≠ 𝑉𝑡 for ≥ 1 . This is equivalent to saying that wealth 
is created gradually, not as a windfall gain (i.e., excess return 𝐶𝑡−1 ⋅ (𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡) is nonzero for every 𝑡 > 1). 
This implies that the overall return is 𝑥 = ∑ 𝑖𝑡𝐶𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑣𝑡,0
𝑛
𝑡=1 . Hence, one gets the project’s overall rate of 
return, 𝑖:̅ 
 𝑖:̅ =
𝑥
𝐶
= 𝑖1𝑤1 + 𝑖2𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑖𝑛𝑤𝑛                                                     (20) 
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where 𝐶: = 𝐶0 + 𝐶1𝑣1,0 + ⋯ + 𝐶𝑛−1𝑣𝑛−1,0 and 𝑤𝑡 =
𝐶𝑡−1𝑣𝑡,0
𝐶
, 𝑡 = 1, 2, … , 𝑛. It is easy to see that  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐶 ∙ [𝑖̅ − ?̅?]                                                                         (21) 
where 
?̅? = 𝑟1𝑤1 + 𝑟2𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑟𝑛𝑤𝑛                                                        (22) 
represents the project’s cost of capital (i.e., the overall equilibrium rate of return). Equation (21) can also 
be written as 
𝑖̅ = ?̅? +
𝑁𝑃𝑉
𝐶
.                                                                           (23) 
This implies 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0      𝑖𝑓𝑓     𝑖̅ > ?̅?                                                             (24) 
(if 𝐶 < 0, then wealth is created if and only 𝑖̅ < ?̅?). Note that 𝑖̅ ≠ 𝑗,̅ since both the overall return and the 
overall capital are different. However, the overall value created, 𝑁𝑃𝑉, is equal.  
Recall that equation (7) has an infinite number of solutions. Let 𝑆𝒊 = {𝒊 ∈ ℝ
𝑛: 𝒊 = (𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛)}  be 
the set of the internal TSIRs and  𝑆𝑪 = {𝑪 ∈ ℝ
𝑛: 𝑪 = (𝐶0 , 𝐶1 , … , 𝐶𝑛−1)} be the related set of internal 
TSCVs that fulfill (7). As the elements of 𝑆𝒊 and 𝑆𝐶  are in a one-to-one correspondence, we can write 
𝑖̅ = 𝑖(̅𝑪) as a function of 𝑪: Different assumptions on the internal TSCV (i.e., different assumptions on the 
vector  𝒊 of interest rates) lead to different values of the project’s rate of return 𝑖(̅𝑪). 
Among the various solutions, consider the capital sequence such that the capital grows at a 
constant force of interest: 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡 (𝑖) = 𝐶𝑡−1(𝑖)(1 + 𝑖) − 𝐹𝑡 , so that 𝒊 = (𝑖, … , 𝑖). Equation (7) becomes 
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐹𝑡
(1 + 𝑖)𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
. 
The rate 𝑖 is therefore the IRR. It can be shown that there exists a subset 𝑆𝑪
′ ⊂ 𝑆𝑪 such that 𝐶𝑡 =
∑ 𝐹ℎ ∙ ∏ (1 + 𝑖ℎ)
−1𝑛
ℎ=𝑡+1
𝑛
ℎ=𝑡+1   and 𝑖(̅𝑪) = 𝑖 for any 𝑪 ∈ 𝑆𝑪
′  (see Magni, 2010, Theorem 3). This implies, 
from (21), 𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐶(𝑖 − ?̅?) for any 𝑪 ∈ 𝑆𝑪
′  and 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0      𝑖𝑓𝑓     𝑖 > ?̅?                                                              (25) 
(again, the sign of the last inequality is reversed if 𝐶 < 0). Equation (25) can therefore be viewed as a 
generalized internal-rate-of-return rule, which allows for time-variant costs of capital. Note that, in case 
of multiple IRRs, any project’s IRR is a rate of return associated to a well-defined set 𝑆𝑪
′  of internal 
TSCVs.
10
 
                                                        
10 Assuming a constant cost of capital, 𝑟, Magni (2010) shows that 𝑆𝑪
′  is an equivalence class of capital streams such 
that any capital structure 𝑪 ∈ 𝑆𝑪
′  shares the same discounted sum, equal to 𝑁𝑃𝑉/(𝑖 − 𝑟). This equivalence class is 
named the Hotelling class in Magni 2010. The notion of an equivalence class of capital values (also named 
depreciation class or investment class) has been introduced in Magni (2009, 2010 2011) and extensively used in 
subsequent papers. 
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As seen, the vector 𝑪 such that 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡(𝑖) is the element of 𝑆𝑪
′  that imply 𝒊 = (𝑖, 𝑖, … , 𝑖): This means that 
a flat yield curve is imposed to the internal market. In other words, it is as if one assumed that 
disequilibrium fades away gradually, in such a way that the project’s value grows at a constant force of 
return equal to 𝑖. (Note that the choice 𝒊 = (𝑖, 𝑖, … , 𝑖) is possible only if the IRR exists.)11  
To sum up, to any pair (𝒊, 𝑪) ∈ 𝑆𝒊 × 𝑆𝑪, a unique pair of economic rate of return  and cost of 
capital (𝑖,̅ ?̅?) is generated, such that  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐶 ∙ [𝑖(̅𝑪) − ?̅?(𝑪)]                                                                   (26)  
so that value is created if and only if 𝑖(̅𝑪) > ?̅?(𝑪).  The SRR,  𝑗 ̅, is equal to the economic rate of return 
𝑖(̅𝑪) generated by a TSCV equal to 𝑪 = (𝐶0 , 𝑉1,, , , . 𝑉𝑛−1) and it is equivalent to the average rate of return 
obtained when disequilibrium is swept away rapidly by an efficient market. In contrast, if disequilibrium 
peters out gradually, there are as many solutions as there are ways in which equilibrium is restored. For 
example, the IRR, 𝑖, is equal to the economic rate of return 𝑖(̅𝑪) associated with a TSCV equal to  𝑪 =
(𝐶0 , 𝐶1(𝑖), 𝐶2(𝑖), … , 𝐶𝑛−1(𝑖)) and is the average return rate that would be obtained if capital grew at a 
constant pace equal to 𝑖. Other solutions are possible, depending on the assumption made on 𝑪 (or, which 
is the same, on 𝒊). 
Assume now the yield curve is flat, so that 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑟 for every 𝑡: The equilibrium          rate 
(cost of capital) is constant in every period. In this case, letting 𝐶: = ∑ 𝑐𝑡−1𝑣
𝑡−1𝑛
𝑡=1  and 𝑣
𝑡 ≔ (1 + 𝑟)−𝑡, 
one gets  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐶 ∙ [𝑖(̅𝑪) − 𝑟]                                                                   (27) 
where 𝑖(̅𝑪) = ∑ 𝑖𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 ,   𝑤𝑡 =
𝑐𝑡−1𝑣
𝑡
𝐶
.  Hence,  
𝑖(̅𝑪) = 𝑟 +
𝑁𝑃𝑉
𝐶
                                                                        (28) 
which holds for any 𝑪. This implies 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0      𝑖𝑓𝑓     𝑖(̅𝑪) > 𝑟                                                        (29) 
(see also Magni 2010, 2013). In equation (28), 𝑖(̅𝑪) is a function of the overall capital invested,  𝐶, 
indicating that any project is associated with an indifference curve on the (𝐶, 𝑖)̅-plane, where different 
combinations of invested capitals and rates of return give rise to the same NPV. The higher the 𝑁𝑃𝑉, the 
                                                        
11Note that the yield to maturity 𝑦𝑛 such that 𝑉0 = ∑ 𝐹𝑡(1 + 𝑦𝑛)
−𝑡𝑛
𝑡=1  may not exist or be multiple, even if the 
project’s IRR exists and is unique. For example, consider a two-period investment in which 𝐶0 = −4, 𝑭 = (12, −9)  
and a term structure of interest rates in the market  such that 𝒓 = (15%, 40%). In this case, the project’s unique IRR 
is 𝑖 = 50% and its market value is 𝑉0 = 4.845, but the yield to maturity 𝑦2 does not exist (the equation 4.845 =
12
1+𝑦2
−
9
(1+𝑦2)
2 has no real-valued solutions). In this case, 𝑖 could not be compared with 𝑦2 to signal wealth creation, 
but can be compared with the average cost of capital ?̅?. 
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further the arms of the hyperbola (see Figure 1). Following from our earlier analysis, it follows that this 
“iso-value line” is a geometrical representation of the equilibrium condition, under the assumption of 
constant cost of capital. In particular, to each solution 𝜸 of the equilibrium condition (8) there corresponds 
a unique pair (𝑪, 𝒊) ∈ 𝑆𝐶 × 𝑆𝒊 which in turn induces a unique pair (𝐶, 𝑖)̅: 
𝜸 ⟶  (𝑪, 𝒊) ⟶ (𝐶, 𝑖)̅. 
The choice of a particular solution 𝜸 to the equilibrium condition (8) is then the choice of a particular pair 
(𝐶, 𝑖)̅. To derive an economic rate of return  among the infinite other economic rates of return (including 
IRR) boils down to making implicit or explicit assumptions about the appropriate internal TSCV or, 
equivalently, to making an assumption on how disequilibrium is removed through time. 
 
4. The Average Accounting Rate 
Corporate finance textbooks commonly advise the reader to disregard accounting numbers and focus 
exclusively on the relevant cash flows. However, in practice, accounting numbers play a significant role 
in the decision process. Sometimes this is because the decision makers know that subsequent evaluations 
of the decision outcomes will be expressed in terms of accounting profits and accounting rates of return—
in itself sufficient reason for the decision to take account of projected accounting data as well as (or in 
place of) projected cash flows. There is an additional reason: In many situations, the economic 
phenomena can only be really understood in terms of accounting numbers.   
Consider a capital asset investment. To forecast the cash flows of many projects, financial 
managers begin by forecasting earnings (Berk and DeMarzo, 2011; Titman and Martin, 2011; Finnerty, 
2013).  Among the types of investments that invariably require pro forma financial statements are start-up 
firms, build-up leveraged buyout transactions, and project financing transactions. A standard procedure is 
to start with forecasts of sales, an accounting construct, then deduct cost of sales and expenses (also 
accounting constructs). These are needed because the firm has to think about the competition and what 
they might do in reaction, and for this they need to consider profit margins; this cannot be done with cash 
flows. It is then necessary to add back to profit depreciation and changes in working capital (more 
accounting constructs), to arrive at so-called free cash flow (see Titman and Martin, 2011; Brealey, Myers 
and Allen 2011). In other words, accounting values are first-order variables and cash flows are of a 
second-order magnitude: “accounting variables are the ‘independent’ variables and net dividends the 
‘dependent’ variable, not the other way around” (Brief, 1996, p. 28). It is worth noting that, in this 
circumstance, the estimation of (accounting) capital is not arbitrary. Cash flows are derived from the 
relation 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 − ∆𝐵𝑡  where ∆𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡 − 𝐵𝑡−1 is capital depreciation. Obviously, ∆𝐵𝑡 = ∆𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 +
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∆𝑊𝐶𝑡 , where  𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 = Net Fixed Assets, 𝑊𝐶𝑡 =Working Capital. Therefore, both fixed asset 
depreciation and change in working capital affect the estimation of prospective cash flows.
12
  
Needless to say, accounting book values do not always provide good estimates of the economic 
value of the resources of a firm. The stock market values of the shares of the major pharmaceutical firms 
greatly exceed the book values of their equity because their balance sheets omit their most valuable 
assets. However, a cash flow representation would fare even worse: The only asset would be the 
company’s cash balances. So while  ∆𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡  and ∆𝑊𝐶𝑡  might not reflect the “correct” change in value of 
fixed assets and working capital, they are probably the best that is available to the decision maker. This 
implies pro forma financial statements are likely to be useful in the sense that they will provide book 
value forecasts that are the best available estimates of the invested capital in the periods under 
examination. The results found in the previous sections enable us to interpret these book values as 
elements of a specific internal TSCV: 
𝑪 = (𝐵0 , 𝐵1, … , 𝐵𝑛) ∈ 𝑆𝒄       with 𝐵0 = −𝐹0. 
Likewise, the estimated 𝑅𝑂𝐴s represent the associated internal TSIR:  
𝒊 = 𝑹𝑶𝑨 = (𝑅𝑂𝐴1 , 𝑅𝑂𝐴1, … , 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑛) ∈ 𝑆𝒊 
where  𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡/𝐵𝑡−1 depends on the estimation of book values. The equilibrium condition (7) is 
fulfilled: 
𝐵0 = ∑
𝐹𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑘)
𝑡
ℎ=1
𝑛
𝑡=1
.                                                        (30) 
However, in this case, 𝑭 is not exogenously given; as seen above, it is derived from the internal TSIR and 
TSCV as 𝐹𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡 − ∆𝐵𝑡  so that 
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐼𝑡 − ∆𝑁𝐹𝐴𝑡 − ∆𝑊𝐶𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑘)
𝑡
ℎ=1
𝑛
𝑡=1
                                                (31𝑎) 
or, equivalently, 
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐼𝑡 − ∆𝐵𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝐼ℎ /𝐵ℎ)
𝑡
ℎ=1
𝑛
𝑡=1
.                                                    (31𝑏) 
                                                        
12 In many countries, the tax rules specify that depreciation can only be claimed as a business expense if the rate 
used to compute taxable income is the same as the rate used for financial reporting. In this case, fixed asset 
depreciation directly affects cash flow via the tax rate. But the more general point is all changes in the balance sheet 
are relevant in the determination of cash flows because they come, in an important sense, logically prior to the 
estimate of cash flows. 
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From this we can determine a weighted-average rate of return 𝑖(̅𝑪). As the internal forward rates are the 
estimated ROAs, we denote such a rate as 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Applying (20), we find 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑅𝑂𝐴1𝑤1 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴2𝑤2 + ⋯ + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑛𝑤𝑛                                    (32) 
with 𝑤𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1𝑣𝑡−1.0/𝐵, where 𝐵 = ∑ 𝐵𝑡−1𝑣𝑡−1,0
𝑛
𝑡=1  is the aggregate book value, which represents the 
(estimated) overall capital invested in the project. Hence, (26) becomes 
𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐵 ∙ [𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ?̅?]                                                            (33) 
where 𝐵 = ∑ 𝐵𝑡−1𝑣𝑡−1,0,
𝑛
𝑡=1   ?̅? = ∑ 𝑟𝑡𝑤𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1 , which implies  
𝑁𝑃𝑉 > 0      𝑖𝑓𝑓     𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ > ?̅?.                                                 (34) 
If the yield curve is flat, 𝑁𝑃𝑉 = 𝐵 ∙ [𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − 𝑟] and 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = 𝑟 + 𝑁𝑃𝑉/𝐵. 
We can restate (32) in a more general way as the ratio of average return to average book value: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝐼 ̅
?̅?
         where 𝐼 ̅ =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐼𝑡𝑣
𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
   and   ?̅? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐵𝑡−1𝑣
𝑡−1
𝑛
𝑡=1
.                     (35) 
This shows that the estimated average ROA is an accounting measure that correctly captures economic 
profitability. More precisely, it is the project’s overall rate of return associated with the book values of 
capital. The usefulness of average ROA can thus be seen to directly depend on the extent to which average 
book value reflects the economic value of the resources at the firm’s disposal. 
It is also worth noting that the average ROA is unique: The estimation of 𝑭 is obtained by the 
estimation of accounting constructs. To the estimated sequences of book values and ROAs there 
corresponds a (unique cash flow stream 𝑭) and a unique rate of return 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , as well as a unique cost of 
capital ?̅?. So, in this case, the uniqueness of the solution of (7) is intrinsic in the process of estimation of 
the accounting constructs (and, therefore, of the project’s cash flows). To put it equivalently, the way 
disequilibrium is resolved is explicitly managed in the estimations of the accounting constructs. 
Among the various cases, a significant one is cash flow accounting, in which investments are 
immediately expensed as incurred. In such a system, 𝐵1 = 𝐵2 = ⋯ = 𝐵𝑛 = 0, and 𝐼1 = 𝐹1 − 𝐵0, 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝐹𝑡  (𝑡 = 2, … , 𝑛). After the first year, 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡  will be infinitely large (or undefined, given that  𝐵𝑡 = 0) 
and 𝑤𝑡 = 0, dictating that 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  be computed by equation (35) rather than (32). Cash flow accounting is a 
limiting case, where no attempt is made to incorporate any additional information about the non-cash 
resources available to the firm or to match outlays against the revenues to which they give rise. This 
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implies a significant relation between cash flow accounting and the way disequilibrium is solved by the 
market: Denoting as 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝐹 the cash-flow-accounting average ROA, 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝐹 =
(𝐹1 − 𝐵0)𝑣1,0 + 𝐹2𝑣2,0 + ⋯ + 𝐹𝑛𝑣𝑛,0
𝐵0
=
𝑉0 − 𝐶0𝑣1,0
𝐶0
.                         (36𝑎) 
The first-period rate of return is 𝑗 =
(𝑉1+𝐹1)−𝐶0
𝐶0
=
𝑉0(1+𝑟1)−𝐶0
𝐶0
. Hence (36a) can be rewritten as  
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝐹 = 𝑗 ⋅ 𝑣1,0                                                                    (36𝑏) 
revealing that the average ROA implied by cash flow accounting is equal to the (present value of the)  
first-period rate of return generated in an efficient market. As a result, cash flow accounting is appropriate 
for getting information on the way an efficient market wipes out disequilibrium. Therefore, the excess 
return 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝐹 −
𝑟1
1+𝑟1
=
𝑗−𝑟1
1+𝑟1
= 𝑃𝐼 measures the magnitude of the misalignment (i.e., wealth created). 
Reminding that the internal TSCV related to 𝑆𝑅𝑅 is 𝑪 = (𝐶0 , 𝑉1, … , 𝑉𝑛−1) the SRR can then be rewritten 
as 
𝑗 ̅ = (
𝐵0
𝐶
) 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐶𝐹 + (
𝑉1𝑣2,0
𝐶
) 𝑟2 + ⋯ + (
𝑉𝑛−1𝑣𝑛,0
𝐶
) 𝑟𝑛                               (37) 
where 𝐶 ≔ 𝐵0 + ∑ 𝑉𝑡−1𝑣𝑡−1,0
𝑛
𝑡=2 .  
The above result establishes a link with the relevant case of fair value accounting. Consider a 
firm, incorporated at time 0 with 𝐵0 = 𝐶0 dollars, and suppose that fair value accounting is followed from 
time 1 to time 𝑛.13 This implies that the internal TSCV is  𝑪 = (𝐶0 , 𝑉1, … , 𝑉𝑛−1) so that the corresponding 
average ROA is  
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐹𝑉 = (
𝐵0𝑣1,0
𝐶
) 𝑗 + (
𝑉1𝑣2,0
𝐶
) 𝑟2 + ⋯ + (
𝑉𝑛−1𝑣𝑛,0
𝐶
) 𝑟𝑛                       (38) 
where 𝐶 ≔ 𝐵0 + ∑ 𝑉𝑡−1𝑣𝑡−1,0
𝑛
𝑡=2 , so that the fair value accounting average ROA is equal to the SRR:  
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝐹𝑉 = 𝑗.̅                                                                        (39) 
                                                        
13 At time 0, the initial investment of a project is recorded as 𝐵0 = −𝐹0. 
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 Equation (39) sets a relation between cash flow accounting and fair value accounting: The SRR (or the 
profitability index, PI , of which SRR is a transformation), is the fundamental link between cash flow 
accounting and fair value  accounting. 
 
5. Value judgments and the domain-specificity of the economic rate of return 
The results of the previous sections show that the determination of an economic rate of return for a project 
strictly depends on the choice of a particular equilibrium condition among infinite ones described by (7). 
This in turn boils down to necessarily choosing, implicitly or explicitly, an internal TSCV, 𝑪 ∈ 𝑆𝒄, which 
generates a capital-weighted average rate of return 𝑖(̅𝑪). The internal TSCV and its corresponding TSIR 
give expression to the way wealth increase is apportioned across periods (or, equivalently, the way 
disequilibrium dissolves); it represents the economic features of the internal market. The choice involves 
a value judgment, which means that an economic rate of return is a domain-specific measure, obtained as 
an average ROA from a specific internal TSCV. The appropriateness of the choice depends on the purpose 
of the analysis and on the practical environment where the asset is generated and where the investor 
operates. A project is not a mere sequence of cash flows, but a set of economic transactions made by the 
investors in relation with other economic subjects (providers, customers, government etc.). These actions 
and transactions (as well as the pieces of information required by the evaluator) affect the choice of 
𝑪 ∈ 𝑆𝑪.  
This suggests there is no single way to determine the appropriate TSCV (and therefore the 
appropriate average ROA). This insight was anticipated by Vatter (1966) half a century ago: “unless 
capital recovery process is specified, there is no single way to measure the annual productivity of the 
investment” (Vatter, 1966, p. 687). The problem of deriving the appropriate TSCV is an example of a 
problem which is well-known in the philosophy of science: The so-called underdetermination of theory 
by data (see Duhem, 1914; Schlick, 1931; Quine, 1951): Given a sequence of empirical data, there are 
many infinite functions that exactly pass through those points (Schlick, 1931). That is, the scientific law is 
underdetermined by data. Applied to our topic, this means that we may only observe two data: At time 0, 
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the capital invested is 𝐶0 and, at time 𝑛, after liquidation, the capital is 𝐶𝑛 = 0; but, given two points 
(0, 𝐶0) and (𝑛, 𝐶𝑛) on the (𝑡, 𝐶𝑡)-plane, any depreciation schedule is a function that passes through those 
two points; therefore, the internal TSCV is undetermined by the economic data (see Figure 2).
14
 
As an example, consider a share trader, who typically has a short-term horizon and looks at 
changes in market values, as he aims at selling the shares of a firm as soon as their price is sufficiently 
high. In this case, the appropriate TSCV is given by fair value accounting, which implies that, to a share 
trader, the SRR is the appropriate economic rate of return. The same holds for an investment fund. In this 
case, as the setting is one where the decision maker seeks out assets that are liquid, it follows that invested 
capital should be measured in terms of the price at which the asset could be sold in the security market. 
However, even when dealing with securities, judgmental evaluations are needed: “the determination of 
appropriate asset values for the securities is an issue on which universal agreement does not exist … 
Valuation methods will often vary depending upon the situation at hand” (Kellison, 2009, p. 234). 
Identical securities may have different reported values for different subjects: A firm owned by a share 
trader likely has a different business model to a firm owned  as by a long-term investor like Warren 
Buffett. The former aims at selling the shares as soon as they have achieved a sufficiently high value, 
whereas the latter is more interested in long-term value. In the former case, market values are appropriate; 
in the second case they might not be if the decision maker believes the market prices incorporate less 
information than is available to the decision maker. Valuation methods will also vary depending on the 
type of security. For example, an appropriate method for bonds may differ from an appropriate method 
for common stock. Market values have some advantages: They are objective and easily understood. 
However, market values are subject to market fluctuations and lack of stability; the market may be itself 
considered inefficient (e.g., if the asset is thinly traded and transaction costs are high), so that it misprices 
the appropriate value of the project; also, unrealized gains are taken into account and market values may 
include speculative bubbles. Moreover, in real life, observed market values can differ from the theoretical 
                                                        
14 If economic profitability is to be measured for a slice of time [𝑎, 𝑏], 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 < 𝑛, the problem is even more 
serious, as the capital values in 𝑎 and 𝑏 are usually not observable. 
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market values 𝑉𝑡 , so the use of either value depends upon the belief that the market is fairly pricing the 
asset or mispricing it. Market values may be even less appropriate for certain real assets: What is the 
market value of the rail tracks owned by a rail company? Historical cost will sometimes be the best 
information available. Historical costs have the advantage of producing asset values which are more 
stable, objective, and easily understood and are tied to the financial records of the firm. Also, they avoid 
speculation and prevent recording an increase in value due to an increase in an input’s value. For 
example, suppose a firm makes use of an input, such as coal, for making steel. If the price of coal goes up, 
this does not benefit the firm’s shareholders, for the firm is not in the business of selling coal, but in the 
business of making steel. “Indeed, the higher coal price may mean lower profits from steel making… The 
coal price is timely, but not an indicator of value to a steel maker” (Penman, 2010, pp. 175). In other 
words, the firms is not “betting on price”. Therefore, the use of market values would be inefficient in this 
case. Historic accounting may be a good basis for a firm’s economic profitability. Gross deficiencies of 
historical accounting (e.g., those can arise with very long-lived assets in highly inflationary settings) can 
be overcome with by using replacement costs (or variants such as deprival value accounting), although 
this approach is more subjective (it is not easy to find prices for old plant and equipment). And then there 
is the problem that numbers might be manipulated by various actors in organisations, giving rise for 
measurement processes that are less easily manipulable. Penman (2010) endorses the use of “hard” 
balance sheets: This means “historical cost rather than fair values, but also impairment of carrying values 
when future losses are forecast” (p. 200) and implies that  focus is on transactions, for “transactions are 
concrete” (p. 201). 
The case of a loan is particularly interesting. Under historical cost accounting, these will be 
shown at face value plus or minus any amortization of premium or discount arising at initiation date. In 
this case, if the interest rate is constant, then it coincides with the IRR, 𝑖, which may be considered the 
appropriate economic rate of return. However, even the accounting of a loan might be not so obvious and 
IRR might not be the right choice if there are major doubts regarding its repayment. This has been 
traditionally dealt with by setting up loan-loss provisions that are then deducted from the amortized book 
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value, resulting in income being the difference between the gross income computed using the IRR and the 
changes recorded during the period in the loan-loss provision.  An alternative approach that has been 
mooted is to reverse the procedure as follows: 
“book the loan at the (transaction) amount lent to the borrower and then, for a few years until the 
borrower has established his or her good-credit credentials, record interest income on the loan 
only at the risk-free rate government rate. After creditworthiness has been established … 
amortized the cumulated credit spread on the loan (the difference between the lending rate over 
the government rate) into subsequent earnings.” (Penman, 2010, p. 201) 
 
This involves the use of a well-defined internal TSCV. In particular, setting as 𝜏 the time where 
creditworthiness has been established, the TSCV proposed is such that 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1(1 + 𝑟𝑡) − 𝐹𝑡  for 𝑡 ≤ 𝜏 
and 𝐶𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1(1 + 𝛼𝑡) − 𝐹𝑡  for 𝑡 > 𝜏 where 𝛼𝑡  is the lending rate for the 𝑡-the period.
15
 In this way, the 
suggested internal TSIR is 𝒊 = (𝑟1, 𝑟2, … , 𝑟𝜏 , 𝛼𝜏+1 , 𝛼𝜏+2, … , 𝛼𝑛). Equation (7) is then used as follows: 
𝐶0 = ∑
𝐹𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝑡
ℎ=1
+ ∑
𝐹𝑡
∏ (1 + 𝑟ℎ)
𝜏
ℎ=1 ⋅ ∏ (1 + 𝛼ℎ)
𝑛
ℎ=𝜏+1
𝑛
𝑡=𝜏+1
𝜏
𝑡=1
. 
 
The loan’s economic rate of return, in this case, is 
𝑖(̅𝑪) = 𝑤1𝑟1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝜏𝑟𝜏 + 𝑤𝜏+1𝛼𝜏+1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑛𝛼𝑛 
with obvious definition of 𝑤𝑡 , whereas the cost of capital is ?̅?(𝑪) = 𝑤1𝑟1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝜏𝑟𝜏 + 𝑤𝜏+1𝑟𝜏+1 + ⋯ +
𝑤𝑛𝑟𝑛: If the former is greater than the latter, the loan increases investors’ wealth. 
The IRR is widely used in Private Financial Initiative (PFI) schemes.  However, the advice which 
the UK Treasury gives to public sector bodies commissioning is not to use it if the project has an uneven 
profile of cash flows.  
The widespread use of IRRs in PFI projects reflects the generally even pattern of year-on-
year operational cash flows in such projects. However, if a project has an uneven cash 
flow profile, the Authority should exercise great caution in 
  using IRR as the basis of valuing investment in the project.”     
  (Treasury, 2004). 
 
                                                        
15 Note that, for 𝑡 = 𝑛,  the boundary condition 𝐶𝑛 = 0 implies 𝛼𝑛 =
𝐹𝑛
𝐶𝑛−1
− 1. 
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(See also Cuthbert and Cuthbert 2012). This means that, either an absolute measure such as the NPV is 
used or a different relative metric based on a different internal TSCV should be employed. 
 The use of accounting rates of return to measure whether a firm is making monopoly profits and, 
more generally, to regulate the setting of prices in privatized monopolies such as water utility companies 
has a long history in the USA. The major criticism is that the regulator might not take proper account of 
the effect of past investments that have long been expensed and therefore are excluded from the capital 
base when determining whether the prices the company charges are excessive. This can be greatly 
ameliorated if average ROA is used which takes into account past capital expenditures.  To see this set 
𝑡 = 0 as the current date and let [−𝑛, 0] be the past interval analysed by the regulator. Letting 𝒓 =
(𝑟−𝑛+1, 𝑟−𝑛+2, … , 𝑟0) be the structure of normal profit rates and let 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and ?̅? be, respectively, the ex 
post average ROA and the average normal profit rate: 
𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
𝐼 ̅
?̅?
=
𝐼−𝑛+1 ⋅ 𝑣−𝑛+1,−𝑛 + 𝐼−𝑛+2 ⋅ 𝑣−𝑛+2,−𝑛 + ⋯ + 𝐼0 ⋅ 𝑣0,−𝑛
𝐵−𝑛 + 𝐵−𝑛+1 ⋅ 𝑣−𝑛+1,−𝑛 + ⋯ 𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑣−1,−𝑛
 
?̅? =
𝑟−𝑛+1 ⋅ 𝐵−𝑛 ⋅ 𝑣−𝑛+1,−𝑛 + 𝑟−𝑛+2 ⋅ 𝐵−𝑛+1 ⋅ 𝑣−𝑛+2,−𝑛 + ⋯ + 𝑟0 ⋅ 𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑣0,−𝑛
𝐵−𝑛 + 𝐵−𝑛+1 ⋅ 𝑣−𝑛+1,−𝑛 + ⋯ 𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑣−1,−𝑛
 
where 𝐵−𝑡 represents the book value recorded 𝑡 periods back and  𝑣−𝑡,−𝑛 ≔ 1/[(1 + 𝑟−𝑛+1) ⋅
(1 + 𝑟−𝑛+2) … ⋅ (1 + 𝑟−𝑡)], 𝑡 = −𝑛 + 1, … , −1, 0. The difference between the two rates measures the 
magnitude of the monopoly position. 
Another relevant case is incentive compensation. Either in a corporate setting or in investment 
portfolio management, compensation is often based on rates of return. A manager is compensated if 
performance exceeds a certain hurdle rate (or it is tied to a set of increasing hurdle rates). In this case, the 
choice of depreciation policy changes the economic rate of return, which changes the amount of the 
reward. So, the determination of a rate of return for this purpose should derive from an appropriate choice 
of capitals, based on the aims and the purpose of the compensation plan. 
These examples are sufficient to highlight the domain-specificity of the rate of return. Any theory 
of capital valuation needs to recognize that in the real world it is not helpful to view a project simply as a 
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mere sequence of cash flows that can be represented as a vector 𝑭 and then priced and turned into a return 
metric using the same-size-fits-all calculus. There are infinite equilibrium conditions (7) associated with 
the same vector of cash flows; and every equilibrium condition is the expression of a well-determined 
(internal TSIR and) a well-determined internal TSCV, which in turn determines a specific economic rate of 
return 𝑖(̅𝑪). Projects (and firms) are entities that are more properly described by 
(i) a set of actions undertaken by  the investors, 
(ii) a set of economic transactions involving several different subjects (managers, shareholders, 
employees, customers, providers, government etc.), and  
(iii) a collection of tools that are necessary to undertake the actions and make the transactions. 
 However, these can be used as domain-specific elements in a general framework. Formally, all these 
elements converge into a well-determined triplet (𝑪, 𝒊, 𝑭). We therefore suggest the following formal 
definition of project: 
Definition (project).  Formally, a project is represented by a triplet  
(𝑪, 𝒊, 𝑭) = (𝑐, … , 𝑐𝑛−1; 𝑖1, … , 𝑖𝑛;  𝐹1, … , 𝐹𝑛) 
of capitals, rates of returns, cash flows.
16
 
This definition in turn induces a new definition of economic rate of return as a capital-weighted 
average rate of return. The new definition of a project necessarily involves judgment. Therefore, the 
choice of an appropriate economic rate of return involves judgment as well. Any reluctance to make value 
judgments will prevent the achievement of the appropriate economic rate of return.  
However, it is also worth noting that different estimates of capital employed in the project affects 
only the rate of return, not the sign of the excess return 𝑖̅ − ?̅?, which will always be the same as that of 
NPV (or opposite if  𝐶 < 0). Therefore, any TSCV will correctly capture wealth creation or wealth 
                                                        
16 Note that the pair (𝑪, 𝒊) are sufficient to represent a project, as 𝑭 is derived from the pair (in an ex ante 
corporate setting) and can be unraveled back from it in an ex post setting. 
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destruction.
17
 This fact gives accounting data a primary role in assessing economic profitability of an 
investment/firm both in ex ante and in ex post settings. In ex ante decision-making, the equilibrium 
condition from which the economic rate of return is derived is automatically fulfilled by the accounting 
data used for estimating cash flows. So, in this case, we have the investment’s ex ante average ROA is an 
appropriate economic rate of return. In ex post assessment of economic profitability, even if the ex post 
average ROA were not the economic rate of return, wealth creation will nonetheless be captured by the 
difference 𝑅𝑂𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ − ?̅?. This also means that the choice of a particular accounting policy does not impair the 
appropriateness of the average ROA to measure the overall economic profitability of the investment/firm: 
Wealth creation is unambiguously signalled. And given that accounting data are available to external 
users for ex post performance measurement, the average ROA turns out to play a role of paramount 
importance not only in an ex ante setting (for capital budgeting decisions) but also for ex post analyses, 
especially considering that the average ROA is unique.
18
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This paper introduces the notion of the Term Structure of Capital Values (TSCV), which is uniquely 
associated with the term structure of interest rates (TSIR). We show that any asset (project, firm etc.) 
introduced in a market which is in equilibrium creates a state of temporary disequilibrium that can be 
described in terms of a pair of internal (disequilibrium) TSCV and TSIR. Any internal TSCV determines a 
specific depreciation schedule for the asset and the corresponding TSIR determines an economic rate of 
return as an average of the internal period rates of the TSIR. The difference between such an economic 
rate of return and the overall equilibrium rate (itself an average of the equilibrium forward rates) correctly 
captures value creation. The determination of a specific (internal) TSCV depends on the way the market 
                                                        
17 In the light of what we have found, to signal wealth creation with a rate of return and to computing the 
correct rate of return is not the same task: The latter always signals wealth creation, but the former is not 
necessarily the correct rate of return. 
18 Obviously, two different firms may have the same NPV (and even the same cash flow stream) but this does 
not make them the same firm. Therefore, a firm’s average ROA does not suffer from any problem of 
multiplicity. To a given firm, one and only one average ROA is associated. In general, given the new definition 
of project, to every project there corresponds a unique economic rate of return. 
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sweeps away arbitrage opportunities and restores the equilibrium. Therefore, our paper shows that an 
economic rate of return is both a matter of accounting (in terms of a specific internal TSCV) and a matter 
of finance (in terms of a specific disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process). Therefore, an economic rate of 
return is an average Return On Asset (ROA) associated with a specific internal TSCV. 
An efficient market sweeps disequilibrium away instantaneously, and the NPV is a windfall gain 
for shareholders: We show that the resulting instantaneous rate of return is the well-known profitability 
index (PI), and that the shareholders’ first-period rate of return is equal to (the present value of the) 
average ROA derived from a TSCV where a cash-flow accounting system is used.  We also show that, in 
such an efficient market, the overall shareholders’ rate of return is equal to the average ROA that would 
obtain by employing a fair value accounting system (which implies that the internal period rates after 
equilibrium has been restored coincide with the equilibrium forward rates). Furthermore, we show that the 
IRR is the average ROA generated by an equivalence class of depreciation schedules representing a 
gradual disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process equivalent to a constant-force-of-interest growth of the 
capital values. 
As each possible accounting system can be viewed as being associated with a corresponding 
disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process and therefore with a corresponding economic rate of return, the 
findings of this paper conform to the well-known problem of underdetermination of a theory by the data 
which, in our case, becomes an underdetermination of the TSCV (and, therefore, of the economic rate of 
return) by the available economic data. So, the relevant question is which internal TSCV is the most 
economically appropriate one in the circumstances and why. We argue that the determination of the TSCV 
is domain-specific and a matter of value judgment (and, therefore, a matter of accounting). We present 
some situations which are economically different and which therefore may trigger different TSCVs. This 
evidently calls for a theory of capital valuation capable of associating the proper TSCV with each asset so 
that the intrinsic underdetermination of the economic rate of return can be solved. This also implies that 
the notion of project (firm) is not that of a mere sequence of cash flows, but rather as a specific pair of 
TSCV and TSIR brought about by (i) a set of actions undertaken by  the investors, (ii) a set of economic 
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transactions involving various economic agents, and (iii) a collections of tools that are necessary to 
undertake the actions and make the transactions.  
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Figure 1. The iso-value line. 
The iso-value line represents different combinations of capital and rate of return. The case 
 is represented where the NPV is positive. 
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Figure 2. Underdetermination of the TSCV by the economic data. 
Capital is observed at time 0 and at time 𝑛. Each function (TSCV) 
describes a different disequilibrium-to-equilibrium process and, 
therefore, different economic of return (i.e., average ROA). (The 
functions are continuous for illustrative purposes). 
